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In recent times a “new, optimistic, theistic view” of Adam Smith has arisen, challenging the old 
view of Smith as a follower of the secular David Hume.  In the “new view,” Smith adopts two 
types of teleology: teleology immanent in the constitution and historical teleology.  It is the latter 
type of teleology that is primarily addressed here.  In this teleological view of history, the divine 
“plan” progressively realizes the ideal society in practice.  This form of “historical optimism” has 
some foundation in Smith’s writings.  Several varieties of the “new view” exist; three of these are 
examined in this paper in the light of the full range of Smith’s historical writings.  Actually, his 
“optimistic” version of history coexists with a “pessimistic” version.  Some adherents of the “new 
view” seem unaware of Smith’s “pessimistic” side.  Others propose that he became more 
“pessimistic” during his lifetime.  Still others suggest that Smith became more “optimistic” during 
his lifetime.  We show that the “change of view” strategy does not solve the problem.  Smith seems 
to have retained a “hard core” of “pessimism” throughout his life.  Perhaps, throughout his lifetime, 
Smith was an 80-per-cent “optimist”; while the micro-level composition of Smith’s “optimism” 
and “pessimism” changed, his macro-level of “optimism” remained rather constant.  In any event, 
despite the considerable merits of the “new view,” none of its adherents has provided a satisfactory 
answer to Smith’s “pessimism.”  
 
1   The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under 
which he is a Postdoctoral Fellow for Foreign Researchers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, a “new, optimistic, theistic view” of Adam Smith has arisen, challenging the old, secular 
view of Smith.  In the “new view,” Smith adopts two types of teleology: teleology immanent in the 
human constitution and historical teleology.  The latter is primarily addressed here; in this 
teleological view of history the divine “plan” progressively realizes the ideal society in practice and 
this form of “historical optimism” has some foundation in Smith’s writings.  Several varieties of 
the “new view” exist; three of these are examined below in the light of the full range of Smith’s 
historical writings.  Actually, Smith’s “optimistic” version of history coexists with a “pessimistic” 
version.  In short, this article seeks to sketch out the “new view” of Smith and the problem for it 
posed by his “pessimistic” views of history.  
 
This article has five sections.  The first section summarizes the “new view” of Smith.  The second 
section discusses a problem for the “new view”: various “pessimistic” themes in Smith’s writings 
which suggest flaws in the divine design.  The third section considers responses to the problem by 
two groups within the “new view.”  The fourth section discusses the adequacy of one of these 
responses in the light of other evidence and a third version of the “new view.”  The final section 
provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
1.   THE “NEW VIEW” OF NATURE, HUMAN NATURE AND COMMERCIAL
2 SOCIETY 
 
This section addresses several topics.  First, we discuss the theistic foundation of the “new view” in 
the light of the prevailing view of Smith.  Second, we turn to the “new view” of Smith’s 
understanding of nature and human nature.  Smith identifies several ends of human nature.  What 
are they?  How are they achieved?  Third, in the light of his view of nature, we turn to the “new 
view” of Smith’s interpretation of history.  Does it propose that Smith had a teleological view of 
human history?  Finally, what are the political implications of these views?  Let us begin with the 
prevailing interpretation of Smith.  
 
After World War II the view arose that Smith was a Humean: a secular thinker who denied any role 
for final causal explanations (see Kleer, 2000, p.25).  Some of these mainstream commentators 
conceded that theistic and teleological passages existed in Smith’s work but these could be 
removed without harming his argument (Kleer, 2000, pp.14-6).  Such interpretations have been 
challenged over the last decade or so by the “new view”; while the secular view remains dominant, 
support for the “new view” of Smith has grown.
3  
 
The “new view” is that Smith is a theist and his theology cannot be removed without harming his 
argument.
4  According to Kleer, “the principle of a benevolent divine author of nature must be 
considered as one of the cornerstones of Smith’s system of moral philosophy.”
5  Waterman says 
that Smith’s Wealth of Nations ( WN hereafter) is “entirely ‘natural theology’” (2002, p.918).   
 
2  In Smith’s own time many European states, including England, France, Flanders, Holland and Genoa, had reached 
the commercial epoch (Smith, 1979, pp.209,263,431). 
3  On the secular interpretation, see Haakonssen, 1981; Griswold, 1999. 
4  Kleer, 1995, p.300; Hill, 2001, p.1; Tanaka, 2003, p.136. 
5  Kleer, 1995, p.279; see also Kleer, 2000, pp.25-6; Smith, 1976, p.77.  
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Clarke refers to “the Christian Stoic foundation of Smith’s work” (2000, p.67).  Advocates of the 
“new view” deny that Smith was a Humean on theological matters (Fitzgibbons, 1995, 28-32,  
86-9, 94, 127).  With this background, let us turn to some of the details of the “new view.” 
 
Denis says that Smith “sees nature, including human nature, as a vast machine supervised by God 
and designed to maximize human happiness” (1999, p.71).  It “is a coherent system: ‘[E]ven the 
smallest of the co-existent parts of the universe, are exactly fitted to one another, and all contribute 
to compose one immense and connected system’” (Hill, 2001, p.13 quoting Smith, 1976, p.289).  
Similarly, Evensky says that Smith adopted the language of “Design,” which attributes the 
observed order in the universe to a “benevolent Deity as designer” (1989, p.124).  Smith “relies 
heavily on teleological arguments” (Hill, 2001, p.10; see pp. 5, 9, 19; see Kleer, 2000).   
 
Like other “new view” adherents, Hill finds two types of teleology in Smith.  First, she finds 
teleology immanent in the human constitution; hence, Smith “believes that by acting through … 
base instincts … humans ‘co-operate with the Deity’ and serve to ‘advance’ his ‘plan’” (Hill, 2001, 
p.10 quoting Smith, 1976, p.166).  The instincts are the efficient causes but they were designed in 
order to achieve the various final causes (benevolent ends, which will be discussed shortly).   
Second, Hill also finds teleology operating in history: human beings, as “the principal bearers of 
history … [are] engaged in fulfilling the Creator’s telic plans” (2001, p.10; see pp.10-1, 13).  We 
will discuss this metatheoretic view of history further shortly but let us now discuss the logical 
consequence of a teleological view of nature: the telos, or end. 
 
Hill provides the best “new view” account of the ends of human nature.  She attributes to Smith 
(explicitly or implicitly) the following ends: “survival”; “perpetuation” and “population growth”; 
“generalized order”; “happiness”; “prosperity,” “material abundance” and “material comfort”   
(Hill, 2001, pp.10-2, 14, 16, 19).  Something like this complex and elevated set of ends is accepted 
by other “new view” commentators.  In addition, in Hill’s view of Smith, “under a Providential 
regime” there is good cause to believe that these ends will be achieved over time (2001, p.12). 
 
This takes us back to the teleological view of history, which many adherents of the “new view” 
perceive in Smith.  In Hill’s presentation, Smith has such a view of history, combining the stadial 
theory of history with the view of continuing economic growth; once again, the driving factors are 
human instincts (see 2001, pp. 10-12, 20).  A sketch of this “optimistic” view of the path of history 
follows. 
 
In Hill’s view of Smith, “all societies had, or would move through a sequence of distinct stages of 
development,” namely, hunting, shepherding, farming and commerce (2001, p.18; see Smith, 1979, 
pp.689-95).  Further, Smith “perceived a distinct and universal pattern to this development” which 
also helped satisfy the human ends; Hill contrasts “the forlorn poverty of the ‘savage’ age with the 
‘general security and happiness’” in the commercial era (2001, p.18 emphasis added and p.12 
quoting Smith, 1976, p.205).  The “Providential” pattern showed “the Creator’s telic plans for … 




                    
Kleer (2000) gives the best “new view” presentation of Smith’s account of economic growth.  In 
his presentation of Smith there are at least four factors responsible for economic growth: the 
division of labour; capital accumulation; order and good government (two preconditions for capital 
accumulation); and discretion for capital owners to invest wherever they choose.  Kleer discusses 
these in turn, tracing them back to human instincts: these include our desire to persuade; the 
pleasure we derive from “mutual sympathy” (namely, when an agent knows that his own 
sentiments are “equal in intensity to the spectator’s sympathetic emotions”); our greater capacity to 




If one reconstructs other “new view” reconstructions of Smith, one finds many of the elements 
outlined by Kleer (see Hill, 2001, pp.14, 18, 20).  What is also important to note is that continuing 
economic growth is linked by “new view” adherents, like Hill, to the satisfaction of divine 
purposes: happiness and population growth.  First, Hill states that, “for Smith, happiness is a 
function of material prosperity” (2001, p.12 citing Smith, 1979, p.96).  Second, “population 
increases as a spontaneous by-product of material prosperity” (Hill, 2001, p.12 citing Smith, 1979, 
pp.97, 99, 180; 1978, p.159). 
 
What are the implications of these “optimistic” views?  Here we again focus on Hill’s account.  For 
Hill, Smith has a “two-tiered model” of human society with a “clear line of demarcation” between 
the tiers: the first tier, the “big picture,” or “social systems level,” is under divine control and “the 
realm of Final Causes”; the second tier is the “individual goal level” and, whilst allowing some 
scope for human free will there, “[i]ndividual agents represent efficient causes” (2001, pp.14-5; see 
p.11).  Given the supreme rationality of the “system” level, Smith’s well-known disparagement of 
human rationality makes perfect sense; “human design is redundant” (Hill, 2001, p.7).  Humans 
must follow their well-designed passions and exercise their limited rationality in learning not to 
interfere in the operations of nature at the “system” level.  “The grandiose schemes of ‘Great 
Legislators’ are cast in a blasphemous light” (Hill, 2001, p.15). 
 
The key features of the “new view” are that Smith is interpreted as a theist with an “optimistic” 
view of nature, human nature and the path of history.  Next, we discuss some elements in Smith’s 




6  Kleer, 2000, pp.17-9 citing Smith, 1976, pp.13-6, 45, 179-83; 1978, pp.352, 493-4; 1979, pp.27, 341.  
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2.   SMITH’S “PESSIMISTIC” VIEW OF HISTORY 
 
There are various “pessimistic” views in Smith’s writings.  I will discuss these under three 
headings: “pessimism” about the ability of societies to evolve into the ideal (a specific type of 
commercial society); “pessimism” about the goodness of commercial society as it matures; and 
“pessimism” about the permanence of such a society.
7   
 
Let us begin with Smith’s “pessimism” concerning the emergence of the ideal society.  First, Smith 
suggests that slavery will persist throughout history, thus thwarting the satisfaction of the ends of 
nature for many (1978, pp.186-7).  Second, he says that, due to climate and terrain, “the Tartars 
always have been,” and “always” will be, “a nation of shepherds”; the Tartars, and presumably 
others, cannot even reach the agricultural epoch (Smith, 1978, p. 220; see also pp.213,221-3,408.).  
Thus, the emergence of the best regime can be thwarted.  Smith also expresses “pessimistic” views 
about commercial society as it matures. 
 
The division of labour progresses exponentially and, as we saw, is a fundamental cause of 
economic growth.  It also features, however, in the “dark side” of Smith perceived by Marx and 
Heilbroner (see Marx, 1954, p.342; Heilbroner, 1973).  Smith says that, eventually, most of the 
population are employed in monotonous occupations; this “confines the views of men” and the 
“low [class] people” become “exceedingly stupid” (1978, p.539).  Further, as commercial society 
develops, it neglects education and the martial spirit “is almost utterly extinguished” (Smith, 1978, 
p.541).  Finally--with the drift of the population from the small, rural, communities to the large, 
anonymous, cities--the people drift towards “profligacy and vice” (Smith, 1979, p.795).  These 
negative moral consequences of commercial society have been cited as examples of Smith’s 
“historical pessimism” (Winch, 1978, p.117; see also Heilbroner, 1973, throughout). 
 
Now let us turn to the termination of the growth process in a permanent stationary state.  Smith’s 
hints at the emergence of stasis, have been frequently discussed in the history of economic thought 
literature (see Hollander, 1987, pp.66, 84, 163, 176).  In the permanent stasis: “both the wages of 
labour and the profits of stock would probably be very low.... [Wages would be] barely sufficient to 
keep up the number of labourers, and ... [the population] could never be augmented” (Smith, 1979, 
p.111).  The primary cause of such stationarity in Smith’s analysis was land scarcity, but also 
assumed were diminishing returns in agriculture, a limited role for technological improvement and 
a “Malthusian” sexual instinct (see Smith, 1979, p.109; Hollander, 1987, pp.162-5). 
 
What are the implications of the decline into permanent stasis?  Once the profit rate reaches the 
very low equilibrium level, virtually everyone--even those who were previously rich--would be 
forced to work (Smith, 1979, p.113).  The stationary state is “hard” and “dull” for the “labouring 
poor”; the “scanty subsistence” of the lower classes causes such a high infant mortality rate as to 
just maintain the equilibrium population.
8  At this low standard of living, the society fails to meet 




7  For further details, see Alvey, 2003, pp.177-236.  One might also note that, by relying upon a base motivation, the 
essential character of all commercial societies is flawed. 
8  Smith, 1979, pp.99,90; see also pp.91,97.  On the “scanty subsistence” see Heilbroner, 1973, p.247. 
9  The high-wage stationary state of J.S. Mill, and more recent environmentalists, is not envisioned by Smith   
(see Mill, 1987, pp.746-51).     
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Next, let us discuss Smith’s view of the death awaiting all societies.
10  Smith suggests a number of 
scenarios for the collapse of commercial societies, two of which are presented here: external or 
internal subjugation; and the consequences of debt accumulation.  
 
Smith discusses, at length, military affairs and their relevance to commercial societies.  In the case 
of the classical commercial societies, Smith blames the improvements of the arts, sciences, 
manufactures and commerce for the decline in martial virtue (mentioned earlier) and for the 
people’s unwillingness to go to war; even the members of the upper classes no longer wish to 
provide military leadership.  “Thus it must happen that the improvement of arts and commerce” 
lead to “a great declension in the force and power” of the classical republics “in all cases”  
(Smith, 1978, p.231 emphasis added).  At this stage a standing army becomes essential but many 
states fail to institute it.  Even if it is adopted, it culminates in the subjugation of the people by the 
leading general; the republic is transformed into a “military monarchy” (Smith, 1978, 237).  Even 
this form of government, as shown by the Roman case, carries the same fatal disease: “But this 
government, as all others, seems to have a certain and fixed end which concludes it” because the 
improvements of the arts and commerce “necessarily … renders the people unwilling to go to war” 
(Smith, 1978, p.238 emphasis added; see also p.414).  So, Smith showed that all classical 
commercial forms of society inevitably collapsed.  
 
The second scenario for the collapse of commercial governments is the tendency of governments, 
at least modern ones, to accumulate debts.  Servicing a growing foreign currency debt is clearly a 
problem, but Smith adds that, even if all of the debt was owed to domestic investors, a large and 
growing debt is still “pernicious” (1979, p.927).  It will lead initially to increased taxation (causing 
domestic capital flight) and ultimately to the devaluation of the currency (thus punishing the 
industrious and frugal of those remaining) (Smith, 1979, pp.927-9).  This will severely retard the 
“natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity” (Smith, 1979, p.674).  Smith 
concludes that eventually the burden of debt will “probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe” 
(Smith, 1979, p.911 emphasis added; see also pp.497,928-9; cf. pp.342-3).  Despite recommending 
policies to reduce the debt, Smith is not “optimistic” about their potential success (Winch, 1978, 
p.136).  Once again, doom is on the horizon. 
 
Significant barriers exist in the path to the ideal society and some societies are doomed to remain at 
a pre-commercial stage.  Second, sociological and economic problems lie ahead for commercial 
societies as they mature.  Even if no country had yet reached permanent stasis, Smith claims that 
two hundred years is “as long as … human prosperity usually endures” (1979, p.425; see also 
pp.365-7).  Third, regardless of which explanation is adopted, Smith says that commercial societies 
inevitably collapse; he apparently accepts a cyclical theory of history.  Hence, contrary to Hill, and 
other “new view” advocates, Smith seems to hold that the divine design is badly flawed.  Having 




10   Heilbroner, 1973, p.256; cf. Winch, 1978, pp.63,182; Haakonssen, 1981, p.179.  
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3.   TWO “NEW VIEW” RESPONSES 
 
The varied response to the problem of Smith’s “pessimism” highlights the variety of views within 
the “new view” itself.
11  Some maintain that, despite appearances to the contrary, Smith believed in 
the perfection of the Divine design; I have called them the “Panglossians.”  Others concede that 
Smith’s “pessimistic” utterances necessitate revision to the sanguine view outlined previously; I 
call them the “realists.”  Let us begin with the “Panglossians.” 
 
The “Panglossian” branch of the “new view” is exemplified by Denis.  In his account, for Smith: 
“we truly live in a Panglossian ‘best of all possible worlds.’… [A]ny appearances to the contrary 
are a result of our finite, partial view of the world” (1999, p.73).  Similarly, Hill says that Smith 
conceives the universe “in optimistic terms as perfect and self-regulating … all of Nature’s works, 
including apparent defects, are accommodated within a vast, purposeful, beneficent perfection” 
(2001, pp.7, 21 see also pp. 12, 15-6).  This view does not do justice to Smith’s anguish about the 
path that commercial societies are following (see Alvey, 2003, p.267). 
 
More detailed attention is warranted for the “realists,” namely, Evensky and Tanaka.  As Tanaka 
essentially follows Evensky on this theme, we will consider the latter’s view in detail.  He says 
that: “Smith combined the languages of the Newtonian scientific method, the Design argument, … 
civil jurisprudence, … social psychology …[and] civic humanism” (Evensky, 1989, pp.125-6).  
The thrust of Evensky’s article is to show that, during his lifetime, Smith became more 
“pessimistic” about Design and increasingly adopted a “civic” voice. 
 
According to Evensky, in his early works--the Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ hereafter) and the 
early editions of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS hereafter)--Smith suggests “that human kind 
is in some long historical sense progressing toward the ideal state”; the divine design is evident in 
history (1989, p.128).
12  Complicating even this initial presentation, however, is his assessment that 
Smith’s “jurisprudentially based” ideal, whilst asymptotically approached, is never achievable.
13  
The teleological view of history adopted by Hill is endorsed with a wrinkle that the end of history 
is not the ideal but just an “approximation” to it.  Contrary to Hill and Denis, Smith’s early work 
“was sanguine but it was not Panglossian” (Evensky, 1989, p.131). 
 
As indicated above, even in his early work Smith saw certain problems with the emergence and 
development of commercial society (Evensky, 1989, p.131).  Arrival at the commercial stage could 
be impeded by “natural impediments” or “the oppression[s] of civil government”; the latter were 
“historical artifacts” and “the rising tide of social progress” would eliminate them (Evensky, 1989, 
pp.131-2 citing Smith, 1978, p.521).  In addition to these, Evensky also refers to several problems 
which were produced by the evolution of commercial society itself: the stupefying effects of the 
 
11   A third version will be discussed in section 4.   
12   Smith’s view of the ideal society was one “in harmony with the rest of the Deity’s Design” (Evensky, 1989, 
p.143).  In this moral world, guided by the dictates of the impartial spectator and self-command, the role for 
positive law would be minimal; the invisible hand could guide society to “the greatest possible wealth” 
(Evensky, 1989, p.128). 
13   Evensky, 1989, p.140.  Evensky refers to Smith’s discussion of human self-deceit and weakness of will; humans 
often lack “a perfect vision of the dictates of the impartial spectator” and fail to “enforce those dictates upon 
themselves with perfect self-command” (1989, p.128).  
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division of labour, the “neglect of education” and the “diminution of the martial spirit” of the 
citizenry (1989, p.131; citing Smith, 1978, 539-41).  While Hill mentions the first of these, 
Evensky demonstrates a greater awareness of Smith’s “pessimistic” views. 
 
Smith’s second phase was the period 1773-76, when he was in London, revising his drafts for the 
initial publication of the WN.  By the time the first edition of the WN was published, Smith still 
presented “the progressive evolution of society” but his “tone … was less sanguine than before”; at 
this stage he adopted a “new role of social critic” (Evensky, 1989, pp.131-2).  When he became less 
“optimistic” that “the natural evolution of society” was “progress towards the ideal,” he adopted 
the civic humanist voice in order to actively assist in “realizing that ideal” (Evensky, 1989, p.132).  
The cause of this change of mood Evensky traces to the transformation of British politics during 
the eighteenth century: at the beginning of the century parliamentarians were public spirited; by the 
1760s they were corrupted by patronage and swayed by personalized “interests”; shortly 
afterwards, politics became dominated by modern “interests,” where people unite to defend or 
improve their group interests at the expense of the public good (1989, p.133).  Only the third phase 
of the century troubled Smith.  The factional, monopolizing spirit of the merchants was an 
impediment to the realization of the ideal and it caused his growing “pessimism”; the economic 
system of the merchants Smith sarcastically called “mercantilism.”
14  He came to see the growth of 
factions not as an “historical artefact,” temporarily impeding the realization of the ideal society, but 
as endemic to commercial society (Evensky, 1989, pp.132-7).  Smith’s revisions to drafts of the 
WN during 1773-6 reflected his new awareness of this problem (Evensky, 1989, p.135). 
 
Evensky says that Smith’s “growing frustration” with mercantilism led to a re-evaluation of his 
priorities; in the WN, Smith’s earlier concerns about problems generated by commercial society 
“pale in comparison” to his new concerns about the “dynamic corrupting force of the mercantile 
interests” (Evensky, 1989, pp.135,137).  Further, the problems Smith specifically addressed in the 
WN and his solutions are “drawn directly from the language and spirit of civic humanism” 
(Evensky, 1989, p.137). 
 
After the publication of the WN, with its promotion of the free trade type of commercial society, 
Smith was disappointed that his ideas were ignored by the British parliamentary leadership until 
Lord Shelburne came to power in 1782.  The collapse of Shelbourne’s administration within a year 
was critical, according to Evensky, in the “Additions and corrections” to the WN made by Smith in 
1784 (1989, pp.138-9).  By now, the “distorting force” of the mercantile interest “had become 
Smith’s primary concern”; from this point onwards, Smith’s civic voice dominated (Evensky, 
1989, p.139; see pp.127-8).  
 
In the period just before his death (in 1790), Smith made one final attempt to address this problem.  
In the revisions to the sixth edition of the TMS we see “very clearly his new intention, social critic, 
and his new language, civic humanism” (Evensky, 1989, p.139).  He became increasingly 
convinced that achieving the ideal “required the active participation of citizens” along civic lines 
(Evensky, 1989, p.140).  The battle “for the future of the state” was being waged in parliament but 
the mercantilists had the upper hand there (Evensky, 1989, p.140; see p.141).  Consequently, Smith 
“enlisted the classic civic humanist device to rescue the state, Machiavelli’s legislator”: the 
 
14   The policies advocated by the “mercantile” economic system included import protectionism and export 
subsidies.  
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overturning of mercantilism was allocated by Smith to “the wisdom of future statesmen and 
legislators” (Evensky, 1989, p.141; Smith, 1979, p.606).  Smith advocated a wise legislator with 
knowledge of the ideal laws and the art of directing his subjects, in a bearable manner, towards the 
goal (Evensky, 1989, p.141; citing Smith, 1976, pp.233-4).   
 
By the end of his life Smith fully endorsed the civic humanist programme.  While his view of the 
ideal remained unchanged, his view of the path there changed “from a confidence that the invisible 
hand will guide us there [actually an approximation to the ideal] to a hope that civic virtue can take 
us there” (Evensky, 1989, p.143).  Smith’s legacy, however, was different: he was seen as a 
jurisprudential theorist advocating laissez-faire (Evensky, 1989, p.127, p.143).  Evensky endorses 
Winch’s view that it is a “myth” that Smith is an “optimist” who believes in progress and preaches 
“laissez-faire” (1989, p.143 quoting Winch, 1978, p.81).  In doing so, Evensky is also attacking 
Hill, and other “Panglossians.” 
 
The “pessimistic” aspects in Smith’s writings are dealt with in different ways by two branches of 
the “new view.”  The members of the “Panglossian” wing are ignorant of, or essentially ignore, the 
problem.  By contrast, the “realists” take the issue seriously, proposing that Smith became 
progressively more “pessimistic” over time.  Hence, Smith gradually modifies his account of 
teleological history by increasing the scope for human rationality and action; this is especially 
evident in the growing role allocated to the legislator.  The next section scrutinizes the adequacy of 
the “realist” response to Smith’s “pessimism.” 
 
 
4.   A RECONSIDERATION OF THE “REALIST” RESPONSE 
 
In this section we will reconsider the “realist” view that, during his lifetime, Smith became more 
“pessimistic” about the possibility of reaching the ideal society (or something very close to it) over 
time.  This view is contested by other evidence and a third version of the “new view.”   
 
Another advocate of the “new view,” Fitzgibbons, apparently without knowledge of Evensky, takes 
up the issues addressed in the previous section.  His conclusions run in the opposite direction.  He 
argues that there are “pessimistic” passages in Smith’s writings but these are associated with his 
early writings; Smith became increasingly “optimistic” over time.
15  I call this the “anti-realist” 
view. 
 
Fitzgibbons argues that Smith has an ideal regime; this regime was a type of commercial society 
which combined monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, such as that found Britain at the time 
(Fitzgibbons, 1995, p.120 citing Smith, 1978, pp.421-2).  This ideal had other elements which were 
missing from Britain but the latter was “unique” because it could potentially be transformed into 
the ideal (Fitzgibbons, 1995, p.120).  By contrast, the general trend of history was less sanguine.  In 
his early writings Smith adopts the view that there is a cycle of political regimes combined with an 
upward “spiral” through the economic stages of history (Fitzgibbons, 1995, pp.116-7).  At the same 
time, decay commenced due to the loss of martial virtue and the unwillingness of all classes to go 
to war (Fitzgibbons, 1995, p.121).  Being forced to rely upon mercenaries, conscripts and those 
 
15   I adopted a similar view elsewhere (see Alvey, 2003, pp.239-48).  
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without moral virtue, the society is vulnerable from within and without.  As Fitzgibbons points out, 
external vulnerability means that a standing army becomes essential for survival but, along classic 
civic humanist lines, in his early writings Smith rejects it as a threat to liberty (1995, pp.121-2 
citing Smith, 1978, pp.543-4).  As we saw earlier, even the adoption of a standing army only delays 
the inevitable.  Hence, as Fitzgibbons points out, in his early writings Smith sees commercial 
society as “transient” and in thoroughly civic terms opposes the means which can prolong its life, 
presumably because the cure is worse than the disease (1995, p.122).  For Fitzgibbons, the overall 
tone in Smith’s early work is “pessimistic.” 
 
Fitzgibbons’s next step is to show that “Smith clearly changed his mind” in an “optimistic” 
direction (1995, p.123).  In the past, commercial societies were overwhelmed by pre-commercial 
“barbarian” people; but Smith came to believe that modern military technology combined with a 
“properly constituted” standing army (one led by the king and the leading citizens) gave 
commercial societies a decisive advantage over “barbarian” threats (Fitzgibbons, 1995, pp.122-3; 
see Smith, 1979, pp 706-8).  This combination would be militarily successful and not threaten 
individual liberties (Fitzgibbons, 1995, pp.122-3 citing Smith, 1979, pp.706-7).  Under these 
circumstances commercial society could “escape from the old cycle” (Fitzgibbons, 1995, p.123; see 
also McNamara, 1998, p.51).   
 
Thus, in the WN, Smith revised his views presented in the LJ.  Smith suggested in the WN that the 
major factor in the fall of the classical republics was not the arts and commerce but the lack of a 
standing army (1979, pp.698-702).  The reasons given for the demise of the Roman Republic was 
revised to the ill-advised admission of many Italians to Roman citizenship (Smith, 1979, pp.622-4).  
Special factors (notably the degeneration of the army into a mere militia) were now blamed for the Fall 
of the Roman Empire (Smith, 1979, pp.703-5). 
 
Let us consider one further example where Smith seems to have revised his thinking: the 
sociological problems caused by the division of labour.  His view that in commercial societies 
“[t]he minds of men are contracted and rendered incapable of elevation” is softened in the WN by 
the possibility that the negative effects of the division of labour could be remedied; as Fitzgibbons 
says, “liberal society could counteract this …through cultural adaptation, and especially through 
the reform of education and religion.”
16  Here, and elsewhere, Fitzgibbons says that Smith gives a 
large role to statesmanship (1995, pp.110,143,152-63).  What lessons can we draw from these 
examples? 
 
First, contrary to Evensky, in the LJ Smith already adopts a strong version of the civic humanist 
view: commerce and the arts damaged the classical societies in various ways, including their 
external security.  Smith reduced these civic views over time.  In the LJ, Smith appears like a civic 
humanist, blaming commerce for various social ills; in the WN, he mitigates his concerns by 
suggesting that remedies, such as modern weaponry, a standing army, and reformed education and 
religion, are available (see 1979, pp.701-8, 782-814).  As Fitzgibbons points out, Smith changed 
his mind in the WN; he apparently becomes less “pessimistic” about the harm done by commerce to 
the classical societies. 
Further, the possible remedy of a standing army, which previously was presented as doomed to fail 
 
16   Smith, 1978, p.541 emphasis added; Smith, 1979, pp.781-8; Fitzgibbons 1995, p.156; see also Evensky, 1989,  
p. 137; Hill, 2001, p.18.  
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militarily and politically (and, in any event, as a “remedy” which was worse than the disease), is 
now seen as a true remedy and endorsed; hence, he apparently becomes more “optimistic” about 
the permanence of commercial societies.
17  Decline is inevitable in the LJ but in the WN he is less 
emphatic, merely stating that “empires, like all the other works of men, have hitherto proved 
mortal” (Smith 1979, p.830).  The introduction of standing armies and modern weaponry may 
become the norm.  Smith’s view of the military vulnerability of commercial society drifted away 
from the civic view over time.  In short, Smith became more “optimistic” and dropped his 
adherence to the cyclical theory.   
 
Contrary to Evensky, in a various areas Smith’s “optimism” increased between his LJ and his WN 
and his civic concerns correspondingly reduced.  If Evensky, and other “realists,” are correct in 
their view, that Smith became more “pessimistic” in some areas during his lifetime, Fitzgibbons 
has shown that he also became more “optimistic” elsewhere.  Further, Smith remained committed 
throughout his lifetime to his view that climatic and terrain factors prevent some countries from 
ever becoming commercial.  He also remained committed to two of the causes of decline for 
commercial societies: the accumulation of debt and land scarcity (which ultimately causes the 
stationary state).  The “realist” presentation is inadequate. 
 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
The “new view” of Smith has made a powerful case for a theistic understanding of Smith.  In this 
view Smith was an adherent to the view that the universe was constructed by a benevolent deity; 
teleological design underpinned Smith’s work.  The growing popularity of this “new view” reflects 
dissatisfaction with the secular interpretation.  The problem for the “new view” discussed above 
was Smith’s simultaneous acceptance that certain flaws in the divine design existed.  Smith’s 
“pessimism” apparently coexisted with his “optimism.” 
 
Adherents to the “Panglossian” version of the “new view” do not effectively deal with Smith’s 
“pessimistic” side.  The solution proposed by the “realists” was that Smith became progressively 
more “pessimistic” about the probability of the realization of the Divine Plan; Fitzgibbons, the 
“anti-realist,” proposed the opposite.  Neither reflects the complexity of Smith’s position over time: 
he seems to have maintained a “hard core” of “pessimism” throughout his lifetime.  This “change 
of view” strategy does not reflect accurately the mix of Smith’s views over his lifetime.   
 
Second, even if one version of the “change of view” thesis is accepted as true, the next issue is 
whether the solution works.  Both the “realists” and the “anti-realists” suggest that Smith 
increasingly smuggled in human reason and action as a means of correcting the flaws in nature.  
Can the “natural impediments” to commercial society (climate and terrain) be solved by human 
reason?  The silence of the “new view” adherents to this question suggests a negative answer.
18  
Further, as the “Panglossians” may point out, does reliance on statesmanship and the legislator, by 
the “realists” and the “anti-realists,” really make sense?  Smith’s work is dominated by the view 
 
17   Smith, 1978, pp. 543-4; Smith, 1979, pp. 699-708; Fitzgibbons, 1995, pp.121-3. 
18   Evensky suggests that, in Smith’s writings, these obstacles to the achievement to the ideal are minor in comparison 
to those of political factions (1989, 137).  Even so, it does not mean that, in the grand scheme of things, the latter 
were more important than the “natural impediments.”  Smith’s stress on factions may have reflected his assessment 
of what would most interest his potential (British) audience.  
11 
that human reasoning is feeble and high-quality human wisdom is in short supply.  On the other 
hand, the demand for delicate human interventions grows in commercial society.  High levels of 
statesmanship are needed to institute and properly maintain a standing army, overthrow 
mercantilism, properly reform education and religion, and so on (Alvey, 2003, p.226).  If Smith 
relied on statesmanship or the legislator to save the day, as Evensky suggests, could he have 
realistically held out much hope for success?   
 
Perhaps there is a degree of incoherence in Smith’s writings.  Nevertheless, whichever period of his 
life one considers, Smith was not a Panglossian.  Smith’s “optimism” coexisted with his 
“pessimism.”  Smith seems to have retained a “hard core” of “pessimism” throughout his life.  
Perhaps we can conclude that throughout his lifetime Smith was an 80-per-cent “optimist”; while 
the micro-level composition of Smith’s “optimism” and “pessimism” changed, his macro-level of 
“optimism” remained rather constant.  If this is correct, all three versions of the “new view” are 
confronted with a new problem.  
12 
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